

	New York City
01	<u>Cutler, Robert</u>
DATE	Dec. 29, 1952
TO	
FROM	United Press
BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONTENTS	DDE greets Robert Cutler, Boston banker, at campaign headquarters.
or subject document (led)	68 - 282
8 x 10	
CROSS-REFERENCE	

or		
		Eisenhower, Mamie D.
		Cutler, Robert
DATE	Mar. 29, 1955	
TO		
FROM	NPC 13190-91 & 13193 & 13195	
BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONTENTS	<u>WHITE HOUSE</u> Retirement-Farewell luncheon for Gen. Robert Cutler, as he returns to his banking business in Boston. General Cutler was DDE's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.	
or subject document ed)	67 - 97	U. S. Naval Photographic Center Photographs 1953-61
10 - 3 Photos		
CROSS-REFERENCE		

CE er, or ler orm 		
	Eisenhower, Dwight D.	Hagerty, James
	Synder, Murray	Cutler, Robert
	Rowley, James	Hogan, Ben
	Anderson, Dillon	
DATE	Feb. 17, 1954	March 29, 1955
TO		
FROM	From the collection of Frederick E. Fox	
BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONTENTS	Miscellaneous photos of the White House staff members.	
ED er, or subject (the document s filed)	71-791	
0 photos photos		
CROSS-REFERENCE		

or m	
Eisenhower, Dwight D.	
Sanderson, Frank K.	
→ <u>Cutler, Robert</u>	
DATE	Feb. 2, 1960
TO	
FROM	White House album photo (Natl ⁴ ark Service photo)
BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONTENTS	DDE witnesses the swearing-in ceremony of Robert Cutler as U.S. Director of the Inter-American Bank. The ceremony took place in DDE's White House office.
or subject e document filed)	72-3317 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Photographs as President (White House Photo Album), 1953-61

photos

CROSS-REFERENCE

206 (over) 1/10/54 (100) 32.55(4) Paperwork Pres. 53 61 (Ann. White House - Ford)

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1954

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLE 76-46, # 90
By AK NLE DATE 5/12/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. You wished me to remind you to speak again to the Council about security leaks:

- a. ~~keeping diaries is their own~~ business.
- b. not dictating memos after Meetings.
- c. telling orally to their subordinates who need to know what is desired to be done, and keeping note of who is told (such note to be similarly kept by lower echelons); - in order to build sense of personal responsibility.

2. Attached is a copy of statement you made at Nov. 23/53 Council Meeting (NSC Action No. 969).

3. Since Jan. 1/54, every TOP SECRET NSC paper, including the formal Record of Action of each Meeting, is accompanied by a salmon-colored CONTROL SHEET (copy attached), which must be executed by each individual (1) who reads the document wholly or in part, or (2) who personally handles it and has access to its contents.



ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant
to the President

Handwritten initials

Inclosure -

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE

TOP SECRET

COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 23, 1953

ACTION
NUMBER

969. PREVENTION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
NSC INFORMATION

Noted the following statement by the President:

"Executive Order No. 10501, 'Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States', will become effective on December 15.



"Its purpose is to insure that no information is withheld from the people of the United States which they have a right to know, and to insure that classified defense information is properly safeguarded. The Executive Order defines the kind of information which is subject to classification and makes the requirements of the defense interests of the United States the test as to whether information may be classified. If this new approach to the authorized disclosure of information is to succeed, without prejudicing the national security or confusing the American people, we should take positive steps to halt the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

"Because the national security has been prejudiced by past unauthorized disclosures of classified information contained in NSC documents or discussed at NSC meetings, I shall hold the heads of departments and agencies, which originate or receive classified NSC information, responsible for taking all practicable steps necessary to prevent further unauthorized disclosures. I wish that every Government official and employee having access to such classified documents and information would realize his personal responsibility to his country for preventing any unauthorized disclosures of classified defense information.

"In the event of future unauthorized disclosures of classified NSC information, I intend

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLE 76-46, #71
By AK NLE DATE 3/12/77



ACTION
NUMBER

November 23, 1953

969 (Cont'd)

to direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct investigations to identify the sources thereof in order that appropriate administrative action may be promptly taken."





General Marshall and R.C. at a luncheon given in honor of Marshall, then President of the American Red Cross, in Boston (1949)



Wide World Photos

(Above): Candidate Eisenhower working with R.C. on the Campaign Train (October, 1952). (Below): President Eisenhower and R.C. as first U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank (February 3, 1960)



Wide World Photos

sometimes bring down on my head an adverse storm. But if debate was intensified on a germane issue, it was worth a knock on the head.

At a time when atomic matters were still dealt with on a special basis, Admiral Strauss and I took up directly with the President some problems of targeting in time of war. And, when I was new on the job, Pete Carroll and I suggested to the President trying to save the tottering regime of Premier Mayer of France by at once telephoning to Churchill to arrange for the announcement of a U.S.-U.K.-France conference in Bermuda. The President looked at us quizzically: "You boys think you are Assistant Secretaries of State? Go talk to Beedle Smith." We did. And later the President, with the three of us sitting with him, telephoned Sir Winston. I remember Eisenhower saying: "Winston pleads increasing deafness when you want to talk about something he's opposed to, but he's sharp as a tack when he mentions something which he likes." The announcement of a tripartite Bermuda Conference failed to save Mayer's government. It was my last solo venture into State Department territory.

On a pleasant Saturday afternoon, I was working late in my office over an accumulation of FBI reports² when Assistant Secretary of State Byroade called me for help in getting a quick decision from the President. The Department's top brass was traveling or unreachable, leaving him in charge; and here was a decision that had to go to England by nightfall. The President was secluded in a small northeast room in the Mansion which, because of the light, he used for painting.

"Come on over, Henry," I offered. "Tell me the story and I'll try to get in to the President and obtain his views."

The Chief Usher was adamant against bothering the President in that northeast room. It wasn't ever done, even by the first Lady. But I promised I would tell the President I had overruled his denial and the blame would fall on me.

I had not been in the "studio" before; nor did I intrude thereafter. The President was certainly surprised when the usher let me in. He was dressed in slacks and a brown tweed coat. The room smelt strongly of paint and varnish. There were about a dozen finished paintings racked up on the walls and two in process on easels. The outside light streamed in, hard and clear.

"What brings *you* here?" he asked suspiciously.
"No great crisis, sir, but something that State feels it must answer tonight. Hank Byroade says he's top man on the State totem pole this afternoon. To save him from self-destruction I took it upon myself to overrule the Chief Usher, who didn't want to admit me."

The President turned the conversation to what he was finishing up in the studio. He was experimenting with different kinds of varnish. Taking me around the room, he explained the varying techniques. After about fifteen minutes, I said: "Now, Mr. President, about Aden."

"About *what*?"

"Well, about what I came over to talk to you about. Byroade thought I had better come without him." The President sat down on a kind of stepladder. I proceeded to explain the issue. The more we talked, the less urgent it seemed. After about half an hour, the President said, "Well, this is what I would do . . ."

Before six o'clock I came downstairs to relieve Byroade's anxiety. There was no walk out-of-doors for me that Saturday afternoon.

One morning shortly after the Inauguration, Joseph Alsop called at my office in the State-War-Navy Building. We had known each other since his election in 1930 to Harvard's Porcellian Club (sixteen years after me). I remembered Joe at college as quick and witty, with the expected vitality of a great-nephew of Theodore Roosevelt and the high, quick Roosevelt laugh.

Joe had slimmed down from his college days. There was another difference, too. Now he was a widely syndicated columnist. It was on this business that he had come to talk. He spoke of "confidants" in the press whom former Presidents had used to create a favorable background and of the benefit derived from that relationship. Such a person, trusted by a President, could provide an anonymous channel to help shape public opinion. I listened attentively.

In "our" case, he went on, there could be a much closer relation of confidence. His family's tradition was Republican. He and I had known each other during his college days and had shared good times since then together at our Cambridge Club. Naturally, he did not contemplate that I would reveal anything of a secret

nature. But by periodically outlining background material I could provide enough orientation to make his column an authoritative, but of course anonymous, spokesman for the President. In this way, a helpful channel would be open to the President without the world being aware of the source of the background. While there was no mention of "exclusive," I sensed that Joe anticipated such a sensible arrangement.

"Well, Joe, I think I understand your offer to help us — and to help yourself, too, I guess. I'm sorry to say that I can't accept. I'm telling you now that I won't be able again, while I'm down here in Washington, to talk with you about this kind of thing."

Then I proceeded to explain my arrangement with the President not to talk in public or with the press, or to any people other than those who "need to know," about the substance of the Council operations. I patiently told him the reasons which I have earlier mentioned for this arrangement. **I was to be exclusively engaged in the most sensitive matters in Government.** If the national interest required that any matter in that area should be disclosed, the President (or someone he should select) should make the disclosure. It was his, not my, business whether open or unattributable disclosure be made. The President at his weekly press conference would answer questions put to him as frankly and fully as he thought desirable. His Press Secretary would always be available for inquiries. If the *best* answer was sought, it should come from the President's lips. As for disclosing inchoate matters pending before the Planning Board or the Council, who could tell which would come to fruition and which would wither? To give advance information of matters still in flux could only add confusion.

Joe appeared annoyed. I had not understood what he was talking about. He and I had an unusual relationship which could be used to assist the Administration in the anonymous way he had explained. As for press conferences and Hagerty. . . . As he went on, his vexation increased. When I referred again to my arrangement with the President, he left the office.

The next morning I received a personal letter from him touching on the high spots of his talk and suggesting that I consider again the offered help. When I was in the President's office later in the day, I asked him to read the letter. He did so, with mounting color.

"Do you know Alsop?"

I told the President of our two decades of friendly acquaintance from membership in the same college club.

"What did you tell him?"

"I told him that, under the arrangement I have with you as your Special Assistant, I couldn't possibly do what he asked. In fact, I told him I could not talk with him again about a matter of this kind."

The President said sharply: "That goes for me, too."

In that first year of 1953, the only exercise I got a chance to take was towards the end of Saturday afternoon. It was pleasant to wander through the streets of Georgetown, looking at the old-world houses. One Saturday in December — the last before Christmas, I think, for holly and mistletoe were everywhere and a light snow faintly dusted the ground — my walk happened to carry me by Alsop's pleasant Georgetown house. I paused and looked at it. How foolish it was for two old friends at Christmastime not to be speaking together. I turned and walked up the curving stairs and rang the bell. The door opened to reveal Joe standing with a smile and outstretched hand. "Come in, Bobby, come in. It's cold out — would you like a drink?"

"Yes, I would, Joe, and thank you. I've had my walk and I'd enjoy taking a little Christmas cheer."

Seating me by the fire, Joe bustled up a tremendous glass of bourbon and water. It was strong enough to bring Christmas with a jump. Soon we were talking easily together about old times and happy days. I felt glad that this was so and relaxed.

When after a half hour I got up to leave, my host asked: "Wouldn't you like another?"

"Yes, I would, Joe, but I don't think I'd better."

His voice took on an acerbic tinge. **"I suppose you think that, if you took another, you'd tell me some of those top secrets?"**

"Yes, Joe, that's part of it, certainly. But thank you and Merry Christmas."

During the seven years after I went down the circular outer stairs, the Alsop column had no good word for me.

After I left the President's service on April 1, 1955, I continued a deep concern over what I considered the occasional irresponsible publication by American media of communication of classified national security material. In a speech at Cincinnati in May

more flexible the procedures which had been necessary during the initial testing and familiarizing period. He wished to provide opportunities for the Council and its two subsidiary Boards to see America's military might through on-the-spot visits and graphic presentations; and he wished gradually to move from weekly consideration by the Council of policy *documents* to more free debate on policy *issues*. Could not the Planning Board, on the basis of such debates, proceed to draft the necessary policy papers for Presidential consideration?

The President's reaffirmation of his wish to extend the usefulness of the Council machinery enabled me, when the new Secretary of Defense was installed, to schedule much earlier consideration by the Council of major issues to be involved in the long preparation of the Defense budget. In addition, I persuaded the Secretary of State to try an innovation in the preparation of "position papers" for important international conferences. Hitherto such papers had by custom been prepared by the State Department without prior seeking out of the views of affected agencies. Dulles agreed that for the December NATO Council meeting a special committee, integrated from the departments and agencies involved and chaired by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, would prepare the "position papers" on the substantial issues.

To implement the first of the President's suggestions, the Planning Board and its Staff Assistants made a weekend visit at sea on the aircraft carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, and the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board together journeyed to the missile launching sites at Cape Canaveral. In June, the President, members of the Council, and other top officials spent two days and nights at sea aboard the giant carrier *Saratoga*. These trips were filled with briefings and demonstrations to present the information with which Eisenhower wished those working with him on policy to have firsthand familiarity.

In the early part of Eisenhower's first term, the intelligence community was getting its wind up over Soviet progress in various military and technological fields: longer-range, more powerful war planes; atomic and (from 1954) nuclear stockpiles, especially weapons of larger megatonnage; a rocket to orbit around the earth; long range ballistic missiles with atomic warheads and hard-base sites to launch them from. Detailed, exact intelligence of the

Soviet progress was extremely hard to come by. On the basis of sparse, dispersed evidence, shrewdly put together and interpreted, it was often necessary to extrapolate. The results — however doubted or acknowledged — showed that the U.S.S.R., in *all* these areas, was on the march.

Comparative strengths of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in the four areas just mentioned, were sometimes depicted without taking into account the basis and other germane factors on which the computations were made. Comparative strengths and rates of growth can give rise to misconception without full awareness of the relevant pluses and minuses. For example, the United States under von Braun made early progress in the field of intermediate-range missiles, which, when fired from our bases in friendly countries ringing about Communist areas, could be as effective as long-range missiles.

The concentration of the United States during the Korean War years upon the vital importance of air power and the possible expansion of its use against the Chinese "sanctuary," generated research and development in the field of atomic-capable aircraft and aerodynamic planes to the neglect of research on and development of the ICBM or intercontinental ballistic missile. Eisenhower speculated that an effective 5000-mile-range ICBM could make previous concepts of war obsolete and possibly reduce the duration of a modern conflict to a matter of hours. When the Korean War was ended under Eisenhower, he caused to be established under the National Security Council a Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) of the Science Advisory Committee, under the direction of President James R. Killian of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to study U.S. military technology and to recommend as rapidly as possible measures for its development, diversity, and strength. As a result of the TCP recommendations in many fields, including missiles and rockets — coupled with the research of the Defense Department's von Neumann Committee on ICBM's — annual expenditures of the U.S. for missile research and development shot up from a rate of a million dollars a year during the Truman regime to some billions of dollars a year under Eisenhower. We had to catch up for seven "lost years."

At Killian's request, I attended the meeting of the TCP at which Dr. von Neumann (one of the world's greatest mathematicians) discussed the basic concept of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Meetings of this nature were held around a table seating twenty-four in a large, locked and guarded room on the first floor of the Executive Offices Building. Such a session was both fascinating and incomprehensible to a layman; the language being that of the internationally known physicists, chemists, and mathematicians seated at the table (such as Rabi, Detlev Bronk, von Neumann, Fisk, Land, Waterman, and the like). On the walls of the room were blackboards (no scientist is able to talk without chalk in hand before a blackboard), diagrams, sketches, and a scale drawing of a 110-foot ICBM. The instant discussion centered on the material to be used to cover the ICBM: a material sufficiently light, durable, and strong to pass five thousand miles safely out of and then back into the earth's atmosphere. When aluminum was advocated, von Neumann rejected this metal, exclaiming in his humorous, delightful foreign way: — "Ah! No, no! Aluminum is too flabby!"

Graphic presentations were more and more employed as time went on to bring home to the Council the details of this novel world of missilery and rocketry. I discussed with Killian the form, manner, and substance of his TCP report to the Council. The report's presentation was a high point in the Council's record, for it influenced the accelerated development by the U.S. of nuclear-capable ICBM's (including later the long-range Polaris missile fired from a submerged submarine). In the 1960 election campaign there was much talk on one side that the Eisenhower Administration was responsible for a "missile gap" vis-à-vis the Soviets. But, after the election tumult and the shouting was over, the new President found that no such "gap" existed.

A novel art is always rife with jealousy, promises beyond performance, technical short-falls, and greatly increased expenditure. Each agency claims the superiority of its particular weapon over the like weapons of other contenders. A layman needed professional help, in this technological jungle, to determine what was beneficial competition and what was duplicative waste. In our graphic presentations to the Council, the clear, scientific mind of Donald Quarles (Deputy Secretary of Defense) and the objectivity of Admiral McNeil (the Defense Department's Comptroller) helped to guide us through the difficulties of the "missile race" and the skyrocketing costs of the new weapons.

The President's second suggestion (as to more free debate by the Council on basic issues) was not so easy to implement effec-

tively. One recalled the unproductive Cabinet discussions in the early years of the first term, before the Cabinet reorganization by Eisenhower focused upon written-out issues. Without an integrated, advance-prepared text as a discussion base, loose debate among busy men preoccupied with departmental duties seldom produces helpful results.¹

The Planning Board devised new procedures to try out the President's second suggestion. For example, it prepared as a springboard for the annual basic policy review a series of discussion papers. Each paper dealt with one or more issues for which it offered exactly stated alternative solutions. Each paper was taken up at successive Council meetings, over a period of two months. On the basis of the resulting discussions, the Planning Board proceeded to draft — in a shorter time, it is true, but I fear with about as many irreconcilable "splits" of view as had previously occurred — a revised policy statement for Council consideration.

For over a year before Sputnik was launched into orbit by the U.S.S.R. (October, 1957), the National Science Foundation (through the Navy) had been developing under wraps of secrecy our American space rocket (Vanguard was launched into orbit in January, 1958). The Eisenhower Administration was thoroughly familiar with the progress — and cost — of Vanguard. When first considered by the National Security Council, its cost was estimated at 20 million dollars; by the time of Sputnik's fiery birth the estimated cost was stated to the NSC at "a low of 110 million dollars." It is difficult now to recall those pre-Sputnik days, when the American people shrugged off rocket-orbiting the earth as "Buck Rogers stuff," and the Democratic Congress pared down or postponed Presidential requests for funds for such "dreams."

But Sputnik's advent changed all that. Now the Congress was urging funds on the Administration for space-rocket development. Now the news media were charged with questions. Why was America behind? Was everyone asleep in Washington? Why didn't those around the President tell him the facts?

Because of Eisenhower's immense popularity, he could no more be personally attacked in the press than motherhood. But his advisers were lambasted with failure to inform him. The *Boston Herald* on its front page charged that I was "so devoted to the

what transpired and had rarely addressed itself to papers circulated in advance. On that historic date, the Cabinet operation was reorganized in the pattern established by me for the Council. Maxwell Rabb became the first Cabinet Secretary. Our warm friendship avoided friction between Cabinet and Council agenda. There was plenty for each to do.

9. I had a standing invitation to come to Cabinet meetings as observer for items which I judged might have some relation, usually indirect, to my Council work. Cabinet meetings were attended by over twice the number at Council meetings.

10. Examples of Special Task Force Reports: the 1953 Operation Solarium; the 1955-1956 Technological Capabilities Panel Report, which turned the national direction to missileery; the 1957-1958 Gaither Committee Report on Civil Defense and related national defense. The Net Evaluation Study was prepared annually by a multi-Department Committee working through an expert team, under the personal direction of a distinguished retired Senior Officer appointed by the President, to assess the national survival after surprise atomic attack.

11. Andrew J. Goodpaster's work on the NATO Staff, as well as his all-around knowledge and character had made a deep impression on Eisenhower in France. Later when beloved (General) Pete Carroll, the White House Staff Secretary, died of heart trouble, his place at the White House was filled by Goodpaster. For six years Andrew won the esteem and warm friendship of everyone. The President treasured the service of this brilliant, modest, selfless younger American. In the 1960's he commanded a NATO combat division in West Germany. Later, as Lieutenant General, he was appointed to a new post in the Pentagon - The Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I never knew a finer fellow or one whom I admired more.

12. One of this group was Dean Rusk, then head of the Rockefeller Foundation, a former Assistant Secretary of State under Roosevelt and later, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the Secretary of State.

CHAPTER XIX. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1955)

First Term (continued)

1. The Planning Board originally comprised such men as Robert Bowie, an Assistant Secretary of State (now Director of the Harvard Center for International Studies), Elbert Tuttle, General Counsel of the Treasury (now a Federal Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals), John Gerhart, representative of the JCS (later four-star Chief of the North Atlantic Defense Command), and to represent CIA Robert Amory (now Assistant Director of the Budget) and William P. Bundy (now an Assistant Secretary of State).

2. By inherited custom, correspondence and reports made to the President by the FBI passed over the desk of the Special Assistant for decisions as to which required immediate communication to the President. Sometimes there would be four or five communications a week; all of which I would scrutinize with the aid of Patrick Coyne, the NSC Staff's Internal Security expert, and at a suitable time summarize for the President.

3. My concern over American publication in time of propaganda war of classified material arose from the indiscriminate impact of such publication on many different audiences. If beamed to the American people, the story was also heard by four entirely different audiences:

The peoples of the allied nations of the Free World, our friends; those whose goodwill and contributive strength *we* need as much as *they* need ours.

The peoples in the uncommitted nations of the world.

The subjugated peoples of the Soviet satellite nations, oppressed by the cruel yoke of their servitude and grasping for fragments of freedom on clandestine wireless.

The Communist regimes in Moscow and Peiping. Not the people, who receive only such perversion of our voice as passes through their masters' filters, or receive nothing at all.

A solution for my concern was suggested near the close of my remarks:

"If the United States is to release sensitive security material, we must weigh each fact and idea to be released in terms of relative effect upon the recipient audiences. What is the objective we seek in such release? Will the move toward *that* objective, which is to be expected from telling a fact to one audience, be cancelled out by the repercussive effect on another, or by propaganda distortions by the manipulators who make up the Communist regimes in Moscow and Peiping? . . .

"In this world where freedom as never before struggles rawly for survival, what is the role of free speech and free press in the United States with respect to publication of secret security matters? Is it enough today merely to assert these principles in order to enjoy their exercise in these secret and sensitive areas? Or must free speech and free press validate themselves in these areas? I think they must expose their contribution to our survival; *they must show that the Free World will be stronger, the neutrals better disposed, the subject peoples rallied, and the Communist regimes put to a disadvantage, by making our secret projects known to the world.*"

4. I expressed my gratitude to the Eisenhowers for their dinner in the following letter:

Dear Mamie and Ike:

For the requirements of this letter, I am forced to abandon every vestige of protocol and return to the "old style" of earlier times.

Saturday night was RC's apogee or apotheosis or transfiguration or some wonderful and happy thing that occasionally happens to some unworthy fellow to remind him why life is really worth living.

To be kind to me would be enough reward, for certain. But to be kind also to so many of my loved ones and friends - this was indeed affectionate regard pressed down and running over.

Boston, where I was last night and this morning, is prostrate with excitement. And I don't wonder. For more generous, friendly hosts, who made all of them feel at home, cannot be imagined!

I have a special debt for Mamie, who despite her health made this big effort - and I trust that the effort so unselfishly undertaken did not make her feel worse.

To the modern Rembrandt, for his gift of "The Mill," I will say this: I would never swap it for Rembrandt's "Mill" for which Joe Widener paid a half million. Only one picture can be hung in my heart.

Really, my dear friends, "la nuit de gloire est arrivée": and Ulysses' old dog "Argus" is on his toes.

Affectionately,
Bobby